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RELIGION AND THE POLICE POWER
IN WISCONSIN*
William W. Boyer, Jr.**
It is elementary in the American federal system of government that
the states have reserved to them the police power. This power has
been variously defined; but essentially it includes the power of the state,
and of course its subdivisions, to enact laws and regulations to protect
and encourage the public health, safety, morals, comfort, welfare and
convenience of the people.'
How ieligion in the State of Wisconsin stands in relation to the
police power is the subject of this discussion.2 For instance, issues have
been raised as to the legality of the employment of chaplains in state
institutions, the distribution of religious literature on public thorough-
fares, the holding of religious meetings in public places, the operation
of public health measures in parochial schools, and the imposition of
religious tests as conditions for membership in private organizations.
These are but a few of the questions analyzed here. What follows
comprehends discussion of those police power policies of the State of
Wisconsin which have touched the subject of religion.3
* This article comprises a portion of the author's University of Wisconsin Ph.D.
dissertation in political science entitled Church-State Relations in Wisconsin.
Other articles from this dissertation are Public Transportation of Parochial
School Pupils, published in 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 64, Religious Education of Public
School Pupils in Wisconsin, to be published in the March, 1953 issue of the
Wisconsin Law Review, and Property Rights of Religious Institutions in Wis-
consin published in the Spring 1953 issue of the Marquette Law Review.
**B.A,, College of Wooster (1947); M.A., University of Wisconsin (1949);
Formerly, Instructor in Political Science, University of Florida (1950), Grin-
nell College (1951-1952) ; Presently, recipient of a grant from the Fund For
Adult Education of the Ford Foundation.
I "This power has been defined in varying language, but of substantially the
same general import. 'All laws for the protection of life, limb, and health, for
the quiet of the person, and for the security of property,' fall within the
general police powers of government. 'All persons and property are subjected
to all necessary restraints and burdens, to secure the general comfort, health
and prosperity of the state'; and it has been said that 'it is co-extension with
self-protection. . . . It is that inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort and welfare of society.'"
State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390, 398-9, 70 N.W. 347, 349 (1897).
2 For a classic treatment of the police power, see: FREUND, THE POLICE POWER,
PUBLIC PoLIcY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Chicago, 1904). See, also Saref,
S. M., The Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Police Power, 15 MARQ. L. REv.
1 (1930).
3 For discussion of other aspects of Church-State relations in Wisconsin, see:
Boyer, Public Transportation of Parochial School Pupils (in the January issue
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CLERGYMEN
Eligibility to Public Office
That clergymen occupy a crucial position in protecting the public
morals in Wisconsin was recognized at an early date. Prior to the first
convention for framing a constitution for the state, a few Wisconsin
newspapers engaged in a lively battle of words concerning the eligibility
of clergymen to public office. Foremost among those opposing such
eligibility was the Milwaukee Courier. In contemplation of the framing
of constitutional provisions on the subject, its editorial of November 19,
1845, read, in part, as follows:
"The messengers from God to man have, or ought to have,
a holier ambition in carrying out the precepts of their divine
master than in entering the wrangling field of political debate.
The mild influences of the one are lost in the angry turmoil of
the other. We are willing they may 'vote, pay tax, and run,' not
for Congress, however, but 'in the race that is set before them,'
satisfied that in confining themselves to their proper Christian
duties they will reflect a higher and nobler honor ... than if they
are found as political disputants and candidates of a party ...
We cheerfully suscribe to the ... suggestion ... that 'we want
no church and state legislation,' and hope to see no union of the
kind; and if the ministers of the 'church' will confine them-
selves within their proper sphere, we think . . . that the 'state'
need apprehend no danger from that quarter." 4
Needless to say, no such constitutional restriction was forthcoming;
but the Courier's opinion illustrates how far some were willing to
carry separation of Church and State. On September 9, 1846, the
Courier stated that it did not "expect to hear of the establishment or
endowment of any religion, or any restriction of the free exercise of
any mode of religious worship, any more than we look for the sup-
pression of moonshine and the establishment of perpetual sunshine." 5
Its expectation was fulfilled so far as the adopted constitution provided
for religious liberty, at least. Article I, section 18 provides:
"The right of every man to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed;
nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any
of 1952 Wis. L. REV.), Religious Education bf Public School Pupils in Wis-
consin (in the March issue of 1953 Wis. L. REV.), and Property Rights of Re-
ligious Institutions in Wisconsin 36 MARQ. L. REv. 328 (1953).
4 Quaife, ed., THE MOVEMENT FOR STATEHOOD 1845-1846 212-3 (Wis. Hist. Soc.,
1914). "Who so blind as not to foresee the result upon society should an am-
bitious man assume the robes of a priest in a popular church to work out
political distinction? His office of gospel teacher admits him into the most
confidential domestic relations of life, and his influence over the minds of his
flock, through the various members of their families, is of the most binding
nature. If to this is added the strength of political party organization, he holds
an undue and unjust influence as an individual." Milwauke Courier, Nov. 26,
1845; id. at 214.5Id. at 231.
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place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his
consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights
of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to
any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any
money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious
societies, or religious or theological seminaries."'6
Chaplains
On the very threshold of' statehood, in January, 1849, the Attorney
General was asked to reply to a request from the new Wisconsin
senate "in regard to the constitutionality of an appropriation to pay for
the services of a chaplain."7 Concerning Article I, section 18, Attorney
General James S. Brown said:
"An appropriation to pay a chaplain for his services either in the
Senate or Assembly is in no respect an appropriation for the
benefit of a religious Society within the terms of the constitution,
but is a payment to a private person for his - own services
rendered to the public. It is true that an indirect advantage may
arise to some religious society but the same benefit might result
from the payment of a debt of any nature due to a member of a
religious society. But the appropriation under consideration is
for the personal benefit of a private individual and one in which
no religious society has a legal interest. The first part of the
same section prohibiting a law to compel any individual to assist
or maintain any ministry, does not affect any appropriation from
the public Treasury to pay for the services of a chaplain.",,
Although the 1849 legislature did not pass a law permitting all state
institutions to employ chaplains, it did require the keeper of each
prison to provide, at public expense, a copy of the Bible or New
Testament for each prisoner, "who may be able or desirous to read,"
for his use during confinement. "And any minister of the gospel
disposed to aid in reforming the prisoners, and instructing them in
their moral and religious duties, shall have access to them at seasonable
and proper times."9 This provision was retained, in substance, until
1947. In 1878, the revised statutes provided for a state prison chaplain
who "shall hold divine service in the chapel once on each Sunday,
instruct the prisoners in their moral and religious duties, and visit the
sick on suitable occasions."'10
6 For discussion of adoption of this section, see: Brown, The Making of the
Wisconsin Constitution, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 57-8.
7 Report of Attorney General on the Constitutionality of Appropriation to Pay
Chaplain, SENAT E JOURNAL 44-6 (1849).
a Id. at 45.
9 Wis. REv. STAT. cl. 153, sec. 9 (1849).10Wis. Rrv. STAT. ch. 201, sec. 4905 (1878), formerly Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 188,
sec. 13 (1858). "He shall also act as librarian and prepare and keep a list of
the number and titles of the books in the library. He shall be in attendance at
the priion daily during usual business hours, unless excused by the warden.
He shall devote not less than three hours per day, once in each week and
1953]
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Curiously, the 1878 revised statutes in addition provided that a
"Catholic clergyman may also be engaged by the warden" of the state
prison to hold services "once each month for the benefit of prisoners of
that faith, at an expense not to exceed two hundred dollars per
annum." 1" This is the only legislative provision relating to chaplains
that specifically referred to a clergyman of a particular faith. In 1910,
Attorney General Gilbert said that if this provision were construed "as
an inhibition against the appointment of a Catholic clergyman as chief
chaplain" it would be unconstitutional as a violation of Article I,
section 19 of the Wisconsin Constitution which prohibits the require-
ment of -a religious test for any public office.
"It is very evident that by enacting said section... it was the
legislative intent to provide for Catholic instruction and services
in case a chief chaplain was selected of a different religious faith,
and vice versa, thus providing for religious service of both faiths,
Protestant and Catholic."' 2
It is a matter of public knowledge, however, that among the Wis-
consin population more faiths are represented than can conceivably be
classified as "Protestant and Catholic." This fact was recognized by an
interim legislative committee of 1947 which commented that "it seems
advisable to omit mention of any denomination, faith or form of
worship," on the ground that the section "does not harmonize with"
Article I, section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.13 Accordingly, the
legislature consolidated and revised the law on the subject in 1947, so
that now provided is the following:
"Freedom of worship; religious ministration. (1) Subject to
reasonable exercise of the privilege, clergymen of all religious
faiths shall be given an opportunity to conduct religious services
within the state institutions at least once each week, attendance at
such services to be voluntary.
(2) Religious ministration and sacraments according to his
faith shall be allowed to every inmate who requests them.
(3) Every inmate who requests it shall have the use of the
Bible."' 4
oftener, if the board of directors shall consider it necessary, to instructing
those prisoners who need such instruction, in the common branches of English
education; and with the consent of the warden, may call to his assistance' in
such educational labors, such persons as he may deem qualified from among
the convicts of the prison. The chaplain shall .make full report to the warden
on the thirtieth day of September in each year of all matters connected with
his labors during the preceding year; the substance of which report shall be
embodied in the report of the warden to the directors, required by this chap-
ter." Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 201, sec. 4905, (1878). See, infra, note 14.
""Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 201, sec. 4906 (1878). See, infra, note 14.
12 RE r. OF ATr'Y GEN. 857, 858 (1910). The statutes relating to chaplains in
state institutions were declared to be mandatory in 9 Ors. Wis. ArT'y GEN.
62 (1920), and 7 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 622 (1918).
'S Comment of Interit Conwzittee, 1947, Wis. ANN. 226 (1950).
24 Wis. STAT. sec. 46.066 (1951), created by Wis. Laws ch. 268, sec. 19 (1947).
"New 46.066 is a consolidation and revision of old 46.03 (9) and 53.05. New
[Vol. 37
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Here, then, was a situation where the legislature held a law to be
unconstitutional on the ground that it was an unreasonable exercise of
the state's police power that infringed upon religious liberty and
separation of Church and State. Hence, the legislature changed the
law. The judiciary had no part in the matter. The new provision was
"submitted as a fair solution to the problem and as sufficient for the
purpose in hand."15 It applies not only to all state institutions governed
by the state department of public welfare, but also applies, "in so far
as practicable," to all county jails.'6
Clergymen in Court
Since 1839, Wisconsin clergymen have been exempt from serving
as jurors.17 Thus, "ministers of the gospel or of any religious society"
presently are exempted.' A clergyman also holds a special status as a
witness in court. The legislature has provided that
"A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall not be
allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
practice of the religious body to which he belongs, without
consent thereto by the party confessing."' 9
This provision has been characterized as declaring "a just rule and one
which practically prevails, whatever may be the statute., 20
To what degree this restriction applies was the issue in Colbert v.
State,21 arising from criminal arson committed in the village of
Welcome, Wisconsin. One Mrs. Colbert was charged with setting her
(3) is suggested by old 55.08, relating to jails. The appointment of chaplains
and their duties are left to the rules and regulations of the department.
Old 53.06 was created by ch. 193, laws of 1873 and is the same as sections
4905 and 4906, R.S. 1878." Op. cit., supra note 13.
15 Op. cit., supra note 13.
16 WIS. STAT. sec. 53.39 (1951), created by Wis. Laws ch. 519 (1947). "New
53.39 replaces old 55.08. Instead of repeating that separate special provision
on the furnishing of Bibles and religious ministration in county jails, new
46.066 . .. is incorporated here by reference." Comment of Interim Com-
mittee, 1947, Wis. ANN. 266 (1950). In regard to private institutions for
orphans, indigents, and delinquent children: "Any clergyman of good stand-
ing shall be granted reasonable facilities, at proper times and places, freely
to minister and impart moral and religious instruction, according to the
usages of his church or denomination, or who shall desire him to do so."
Wis. STAT. sec. 58.01(5) (1951). It is interesting to note that the department
of public welfare may not, under sec. 56.01, Stats., sell prison manufactured
articles other than those named in sec. 56.06, Stats., to such nonprofit
organizations as denominational hospitals. 36 Ops. Wis. Att'y Gen. 599 (1947).
'7 See, Wis. TERRITORIAL STATUTES, 267 (1839).
Is Wis. STAT. sec. 255.02(2) (1951).
'9 WIs. STAT. sec. 325.20 (1951), formerly Wis. REV. STAT. sec. 4074 (1878),
from N.Y. Code sec. 833 (1877). "The theory that such communications are
privileged is based upon the idea that the human being has need of spiritual
consolation." Torpey, JUDIcIAL DocRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERIcA
302 (1948).
20Revisers' Note, 1878, Wis. ANN. 1430 (1950). "This section is taken from
section 833 of the New York Code, 1877." Ibid.
21 125 Wis. 423, 104 N.W. 61 (1905).
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millinery store afire for the purpose of collecting $250 from insurance.
Father Pellegren, the Catholic priest in Welcome, received an anony-
mous letter, written in peficil and five pages long, purporting to be a
confession from a man in a Chicago hospital who said that he had set
the building afire as an act of revenge against Mrs. Colbert for the
reason that she had rejected him as her suitor. The spelling of words
in the letter was poor and "was apparently the product of an illiterate
mind." It closed with the request that it be published to "correct"
things. Father Pellegren read the letter to Mrs. Colbert and she wrote
the following statement and gave it to him:
"Pleas, I declare that no stranger spoke to me on July lo, 192,
that I had now ideay how the fire started, I dellare that the
lettler is unknown to me. Mrs. L. Coolbert."
Upon trial, the priest testified he believed, by comparing the
handwriting, that Mrs. Colbert wrote both letters. This was cor-
roborated by a handwriting expert. Upon appeal to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, counsel for Mrs. Colbert claimed that the trial court
erred in permitting the priest to testify as to his conversation with her.
It was argued that this was contrary to the statutory requirement that
a clergyman is not allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his
"professional character" without the consent of the confessing party.
The Supreme Court held that the testimony was admissible for the
reason that this was not a confession and the priest was not acting in
his "professional character" at the time of the conversation.
The Wisconsin rule on the subject, then, is that no privileged
communication exists if the statement is made to the clergyman other
than in his "professional character."22 The privilege does not extend,
moreover, to malicious or false statements.23
Marriage Solemnization
There are only two methods by which marriage may be validly
contracted in the State of Wisconsin-only after a license has been
issued therefor in the following manner:
"(1) Before any person authorized by the laws of this state
to celebrate marriages . . . by declaring in the presence of at
least two competent witnesses other than such officiating person,
that they take each other as husband and wife; or,
(2) In accordance with the customs, rules and regulations
of any religious society, denomination or sect to which either of
the parties may belong, by declaring in the presence of at least
22 To the same effect, in other jurisdictions, are: Partridge v. Partridge, 220 Mo.321, 119 S.W. 415 (1909); Blossi v. C. & N.W. Rwy. Co., 144 Iowa 697,
123 N.W. 360 (1909); Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 N.W. 836 (1901);
Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881). See, also, 70 C.J. 451, n. 13.
23Kile v. Anderson, 182 Wis. 467, 196 N.W. 762 (1924).
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two competent witnesses, that they take each other as husband
and wife. '24
So-called common-law marriages are no longer recognized in Wis-
consin.2 5 Also, polygamy is prohibited notwithstanding any religious
practice to the contrary.28
In 1839, the statutes of the Wisconsin territory permitted only
those ordained clergymen who were Christians to solemnize marriages.27
The 1849 statutes specifically exempted marriage solemnization "among
the people called Friends or Quakers" from the rule that the marriage
ceremony must' be performed by an ordained clergyman or public
officer.2 s But no such references to a particular faith or denomination
may be found in the present statutes. Now it is simply provided that
"Marriages may be solemnized by any justice of the peace,
police justice, municipal judge or court commissioner in the
county in which he is elected or appointed, and throughout the
state by any judge of a court of record, and by any ordained
24WIs. STAT. sec. 245.12 (1951), created by Wis. Laws ch. 218, sec. 3 (1917).
These provisions are identical with sec. 1 of the uniform marriage and
marriage license act which was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1911, a note to which explained
as follows: "Clause 2 . . . is in no sense a restriction upon, but is rather an
enlargement of, the provisions of clause 1.. . .Clause 1 provides for the
celebration of marriage before some legally authorized official, whether
ecclesiastical or civil. But since Quakers, and many others, object to any
form of ceremony other than that prescribed by the religious society to
which either or both of the contracting parties may belong, it was recognized
by the Conferen&e that such persons should be permitted to enter into the
marriage relation in the method prescribed or authorized by their respective
religious rites and ceremonies. Nevertheless, . . . it was deemed essential
that at least one of the parties should be a member of such religious society
in order to entitle such parties to the benefit of the looser form of marriage
contract authorized by said clause 2 . . . .which, being an exception to the
general rule requiring a marriage ceremony to be performed by some
officiating person, should go no farther than warranted by the circumstances
of the case. In other words, where a religious society recognizes a marriage
without an officiating person it should do so only because such marriage is
binding on the conscience of at least one of the contracting parties as a
member of the society, and the peculiar rights and privileges which may be
granted to members of religious societies should not be extended to those
who are not members so as to allow them to take advantage of the rules
of the society to which they owe no obedience, and with which they have no
affiliation. . . .The phrase 'any religious society, denomination or sect,' is
broad enough to include not only Quakers, but every other denominational
sect, or society, including the Ethical Society of New York, and other states,
Christian Scientists, etc." Quoted in 32 Ops. Wis. Arr'Y GEN. 105, 107-8n.
(1943).
25 Smith v. Smith, 235 Wis. 96, 38 N.W. 2d 12 (1949) ; 17 Ops. Wis. Arry GEN.
383 (1928); 7 Ops. Wis. Ari'Y GEN. 525 (1918).
26 WIs. STAT. sec. 351.02 (1951), created by Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 139, sec. 2
(1849). For Wisconsin legislative concern with this subject, see: Resolutions
Relating to the Mormon Church, 2 SENATE JOURNAL 691-2 (1905); Resolution
Concerning Polygamy, SENATE JOURNAL 251-2, 332-4 (1907) ; Memorials Upon
Polygamy, ASSEMBLY JOURNAL 272-3 (1907).2 7 
WISCONsIN TERRITORIAL STATUTES 139 (1839).
2sWIs. REv. STAT. ch. 78, sec. 16 (1849).
19531
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
minister or priest in regular communion with any religious
society and who continues to be such minister or priest.129
Because some religious societies differ in their disciplines concerning
marriage rites, Wisconsin law has allowed, since 1901,
"for any licentiate of a denominational body or an appointee of
any bishop, while serving as the regular minister or priest of.
any church of the denomination to which he belongs, to solemnize
marriages; provided, he be not restrained from so doing by the
discipline of his denomination."3 0
But any such "licentiate" or "appointee" must file credentials of his
license or appointment with the clerk of the circuit court of the county
in which his church is located, "who shall record the same and give a
certificate thereof."3' The same procedure applies to ministers or priests
in regard to their credentials of ordination "or other proof of such
official character.1
3 2
In 1847, the Supreme Court of the Wisconsin Territory held that a
marriage was not invalid because it was discovered later that the person
who officiated at the marriage ceremony had not previously filed his
credentials of ordination with the clerk of the county court. It was
sufficient that the marriage was solemnized under a license from a
proper officer in the presence of witnesses and that the couple had
thereafter lived together as husband and wife.3 3 It is not necessary,
moreover, that a diploma of ordination be filed by a minister. A
certificate signed by the President of the North Wisconsin District of
the Lutheran Church, certifying that a named person was installed in
the ministry, and authorizing him "under the rules of the Church, to
perform all the functions of the ministerial office" is sufficient. Such a
certificate presumptively satisfies "other proof of such official character,"
as permitted by statute.34 An ordained minister, furthermore, need not
be in active charge of a parish or church to perform a marriage
ceremony.35
In 1938, the Attorney General held that a person who had assumed
29 Wis. STAT. sec. 245.05 (1951).
30 WIs. STAT. sec. 245.06 (1951), created by Wis. Laws ch. 30, sec. 1 (1901).
31 WIs. STAT. sec. 245.07 (1951), created by Wis. Laws ch. 30, sec. 1 (1901).
32 WIs. STAT. sec. 245.08 (1951), formerly Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 78, sec. 5 (1849),
and WISCONsIN TERRITORIAL STATUTES 139 (1839).
ssMartin v. Ryan, 2 Pin. 24 (1847). In this connection, Wis. STAT. sec. 245.33
(1951) provides: "No marriage hereafter contracted shall be void by reason
of want of authority or jurisdiction in the officiating person solemnizing such
marriage, if the marriage is in other respects lawful, and is consummated
with the full belief on the part of the persons so married, or either of them,
that they have been lawfully joined in marriage." Created by Wis. Laws ch.
218, sec. 3 (1917).
3 39 Ops. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 485 (1950). "... There is no statute of this state
authorizing the governor to confer upon anyone a permit to solemnize
marriage." REPT. oF Arr'Y GEN. 822 (1908).
35 4 Ops. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 978 (1915).
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the position of minister without having been ordained or appointed by
a non-denominational group, the "Bible Truth Assembly" of Wausau,
was not authorized to solemnize marriages.36
But a somewhat different view was taken by Attorney General
Martin in 1943.37 A Wisconsin corporation, called the "Spiritual
Assembly of Bahais of Milwaukee," claimed in its bylaws to have
"exclusive authority to conduct Bahai marriage ceremonies and issue
Bahai marriage certificates within the area of its jurisdiction." Since
the sect did not claim, however, to ordain ministers or priests, and did
not have licentiates or bishops, Attorney General Martin reasoned that
"there is no requirement for the filing of credentials and there is no
authority on the part of the clerk of a circuit court to accept such
credentials for filing."138 Marriage could be contracted, nevertheless,
under one of the two methods permitted by statute, namely, in accord-
ance with its customs, rules and regulations."9
More recently, the Attorney General has similarly held that the
clerk of a circuit court may not issue a certificate of authority, to
solemnize marriages, to a member of the non-denominational "Plymouth
Brethren" of La Crosse.40 Attorney General Broadfoot reasoned as
follows:
"'Elder' Uglum is not the licentiate of a denominational body
or an appointee of a bishop serving as a regular minister or
priest of a denominational church, because the group to which
he belongs is non-denominational. .. . It is noted . . . that the
group . . . has no regular minister. It is also noted that the
document which was submitted by the five 'elders' does not
show that they, or the 'Plymouth Brethren' attempted to appoint
or ordain 'Elder' Uglum as a minister, but only indicates that
the elders purported to appoint him as a bishop for the sole
purpose of performing and solemnizing marriages."
41
Regardless of these facts, however,
"If the Plymouth Brethren religious society has customs,
rules and regulations with respect to marriage, its members may
... validly contract marriage in accordance with such customs,
rules and regulations even though no member of the group
may be entitled to a certificate of authority to solemnize
marriages . . .42
In conclusion, it appears well established that it is not necessary
in Wisconsin for a person to be authorized by the clerk of a circuit
3627 Ops. Wis. AT'Y GEN. 460 (1938).
.3732 Ops. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 105 (1943).
38 Id. at 106.
39Id. at 107, citing Wis. STAT. sec. 245.12(2); see, supra, note 24.
4037 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 449 (1948).
41Id. at 450-51.
42 Id. at 452.
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court to solemnize marriages so long as the marriage is contracted in
accordance with the customs, rules and regulations of the religious
society to which that person belongs. And want of authority or
jurisdiction in the officiating person is no bar to a valid marriage which
is lawful in other respects and is consummated in good faith by either
of the parties so married.
SUNDAY LEGISLATION
Sunday laws in Western civilization date from 321 A.D. when the
first Sunday law was issued by Emperor Constantine. 3 Regulations
governing the conduct of people on Sunday were among the first public
laws of every colony of the Western Hemisphere.44 Thus, Governor
Iverson, on establishing a colony in the Danish West Indies, pro-
claimed in 1672 that every person was required to attend service every
Sunday, "and on failure to do so is to pay a fine of twenty-five pounds
of tobacco. '45 Although English common law prohibited ordinary labor
on Sunday, all Sunday work not necessary or charitable was forbidden
in England in 1678.46 Observance of Sunday was required in each of
the thirteen original states after the American Revolution.4 7 Since then,
in the United States, "courts have endeavored to establish that the
object of Sunday laws (under the police power) is the preservation of
good morals and the peace and good order of society, and not to
emphasize the religious significance of the day." 48
Blue Laws
The 1839 Wisconsin Territorial Legislature provided that punish-
ment would be meted out to any person who
"shall keep open his shop, ware-house or workhouse, or shall
do any manner of labor or business, or work, except only works
43 "All judges and city people and the craftsmen shall rest upon the venerable
Day of the Sun. Country people, however, may freely attend to the cultiva-
tion of the fields, because it frequently happens that no other days are better
adapted for planting the grain in the furrows or the vines in the trenches.
So that the advantage given by heavenly providence may not for the occasion
of a short time perish." Quoted in Johnson and Yost, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNtmo STATES 219 (Minneapolis, 1948).44 Johnson, Sunday Legislation, 23 Ky. L. J. 131-66 (1934).
45 Quoted from KNOX, A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF ST. THOMAS, W. I. 48-52
(New York, 1852). See, also, BOYER, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
OF THE UNrrED STATES 236 (unpublished thesis, General Library, Univ. of
Wisconsin, 1949).4 6 ToRPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 51 (1948).4 7 0p. cit., supra note 44.
48 Johnson and Yost, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
232. But the constitutionality of Sunday observance statutes was sustained in
earlier cases "on the ground of the right of a free Christian people, looking
to the conservation of public order, peace, morality, and the promotion of the
religious ideas pervading their history and indelibly stamped on their laws and
institutions, to set apart the Lord's Day as a recurring period of ceremonial
rest and voluntary worship, To a great extent that ground seems to have
been abandoned, the courts now recognizing the validity of Sunday statutes
as civil or police regulations." 50 AM. JUR. 809; cases cited in notes thereto.
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of necessity and charity, or be present at any dancing, or any
public diversion, show or entertainment, or take part in any
sport, game or play on the Lord's day, (commonly called
Sunday;) . . ."49
The serving or execution of any civil process on Sunday was also
prohibited.50 But excepted from the "no work" provision was any
"person who conscientiously believes that the seventh, or any
other day of the week ought to be observed as the Sabbath, and
who actually refrains from secular business and labor on that day
. .. unless he wilfully disturbs some other person."'-
These provisions became law by action of the first state legislature in
1849. 52 And they survived the passing of the years until 1933, with only
minor modifications being made during the interim.5 3 In the meantime,
certain changes were signified by the adoption of provisions specifically
stating that the barber shop,54 generalmerchandising, 5 and the grocery
and meat market56 businesses were not to be deemed works of necessity
or charity. Their doing business on Sunday, therefore, was illegal. But,
"the running of any railroad train, street railway car or interurban
railway car" on Sunday was designated a work of necessity by the
legislature in 1913." And Sunday newspaper publication was also made
lawful.58
The Wisconsin Sunday laws were characterized as being "very
drastic, although only partially enforced and only in localities where
religious sentiment dominated public officials."5 9 Although the laws had
been secularized, in 1858, to the extent of substituting "the first day of
the week" for the "Lord's day," 60 they became no less religiously
significant. Historically, it appears that the matter of Sunday legislation
competes favorably with prohibition as a source of litigation. The cases
reaching the Wisconsin Supreme Court were numerous. Many opinions
of the Wisconsin Attorney General were devoted to the subject.
49 WISCONSIN TERRITORIAL STATUTES 367 (1839).
5o Id. at 368.
51 Ibid.
52 Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 139, sec. 21-4 (1849).53 For example, Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 134, sec. 43 (1858) provided that a civil
process could not be served or executed against "any person who habitually
observes the seventh day of the week instead of the first, as a day of rest . ..
commonly called Saturday. ... " And, except for certain specified circum-
stances, WIs. REv. STAT. ch. 119, sec. 19 (1858) provided that "no court shall
be opened to transact any business on the first day of the week." But an
injunction may be granted and served on Sunday "in case of exigency."
Wis. STAT. ch. 126, sec. 2776 (1898). See, infra note 79.
54 Wis. Laws ch. 300 (1909); repealed by Wis. Laws ch. 473, sec. 42b (1927).
55 Wis. Laws ch. 393, 614 (1911); repealed by Wis. Laws ch. 74 (1933).
56 Wis. Laws ch. 296 (1915), and ch. 133 (1919) ; repealed by Wis. Laws ch. 74
(1933).
3
7 Wis. Laws ch. 74 (1913).
58 Wis. Laws ch. 125 (1911).
59 JOHNSON AND YOST, op. cit., supra note 48, at 253.6 0Wis. Laws ch. 171 sec. 19 (1858).
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Generally, the cases and opinions reveal that the relevant statutes were
strictly construed, although much was left for interpretation especially
in deciding whether a particular work was one of necessity or charity.
But the tortuous travail that Sunday laws caused Wisconsin legal
authorities, through a century of time, approximately, merits no lengthy
discussion here.
To summarize briefly, then, Wisconsin legal authorities held that
Sunday closing laws did not constitute deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law. 61 Exception from the statute, moreover,
did not mean that a business must stay open on Sunday. 62 Compliance
required the complete discontinuance of business practices on the
Sabbath other than works of necessity or charity.6 3 But a Sunday
transaction did not always dissolve contractual liability. 4 Moreover, an
agreement entered into, or a contract signed, on Sunday, but not finally
executed or delivered until a secular day, was held to be valid. 5
Negotiable instruments which were executed on Sunday, however, were
void." Indeed, any actual execution of a business agreement on Sunday
was held to be void and unenforceable in the courts.
6 7
61 Stark v. Backus, 140 Wis. 557, 123 N.W. 98 (1909). See, VosE, DUE PROCESS
OF LAW IN WiscoNsiN 111-4 (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin Library,
1949).62Walsh v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 23 (1877); Alexander v.
Town of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 277 (1873). For discussion of transactions of
public authorities on Sunday, see: Ansorge v. City of Green Bay, 198 Wis.
320, 224 N.W. 119 (1929) ; Bloor v. Town of Delafield, 69 Wis. 273, 34 N.W.
115 (1887); De Forth v. Wisconsin & M. R. Co., 52 Wis. 320, 9 N.W. 17
(1881); 10 Ops. Wis. Ar'Y GEN. 824, 373 (1921).63 Hodges v. Nalty, 113 Wis. 567, 89 N.W. 535 (1902) ; 13 Ops. Wis. Air'y GEN.
155 (1918); 6 OPs. Wis. ATT'y GEN. 779, 511, 62 (1917); 5 Ors. Wis. ATT'Y
GEN. 393 (1916); 4 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 484, 124, 2 (1915); 2 OsS. Wis.
ATT'Y GEN. 713, 443, 341, 322, 298, 287 (1913); 1 OsS. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 338
(1912).
64 Weinsklar Realty Co. v. Dooley, 200 Wis. 412, 228 N.W. 515 (1930) ; Becker v.
Noegel, 165 Wis. 73, 160 N.W. 1055 (1917) ; Gist v. Johnson-Carey Co., 158
Wis. 188, 147 N.W. 1079 (1914); Moore v. Kendall, 1 Chand. 32, 2 Pin. 99
(1849). For violations as affecting tort liability, see: Frint Motor Co. v. In-
dustrial Commissions, 168 Wis. 436, 170 N.W. 285 (1919) ; Wausau Lumber
Co. v. Industrial Commission. 166 is. 204, 164 N.W. 836 (1917) ; Masterson v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 571, 78 NW. 757 (1899); Knowlton v. City
Ry. Co., 59 Wis. 278, 18 N.W. 17 (1884); Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa, 29
Wis. 21 (1871). For discussion of the Sutton case, supra, see: Roe, ed.,
SELE,TED OPINIONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE DIXON AND RYAN OF WISCONSIN 228-31
(Chicago, 1907).
65 City Motor Co. v. Nelson, 208 Wis. 219, 242, N.W. 491 (1932); Mann v.
Becker, 171 Wis. 121, 176 N.W. 765 (1920) ; O'Day v. Meyers, 147 Wis. 549,
133 N.W. 605 (1911); King v. Graef, 136 Wis. 548, 117 N.W. 1058 (1908);
Taylor v. Young, 61 Wis. 314, 21 N.W. 408 (1884).
66 Becker v. Noegel, 165 Wis. 73, 160 N.W. 1055 (1917) ; Howe v. Ballard, 113
Wis. 375, 89 N.W. 136 (1902); Hill v. Sherwood, 3 Wis. 343 (1854). The
fact that an act of forgery was committed on Sunday did not alter the
offense. REsr. OF Arr'Y GEN. 232 (1910). But a check made, dated, and
delivered on Sunday was void, and it was not forgery to alter it. REPT. OF
Airey GEN. 249 (1910).
67jacobson v. Bentzler, 127 Wis. 566, 107 N.W. 7 (1906); Sherry v. Madler,
123 Wis. 621, 101 N.W. 1095 (1905); Pearson v. Kelly, 122 Wis. 660, 100
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The "blue laws" were repealed in 1933 and with them all the
pertinent law that judges and attorneys general had espoused. In 1931,
the Wisconsin legislature passed a joint resolution, which provided:
"Whereas, The repeal of the 'Sunday blue law' has several
times in recent years come before the legislature, and there has
always been dispute as to the wishes of the people with respect
to this law; and
Whereas, There is only one method to really settle this
question; therefore, be it
Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurring, That there
be submitted to the qualified electors of this state, at the election
to be held on the first Tuesday in April, 1932, the following
question: "Shall sections 351.46 to 351.49 of the Wisconsin
statutes, popularly known as the 'Sunday blue law,' be
repealed ?,,6s
Accordingly, the resolution was submitted to the Wisconsin electorate,
in April, 1932, which divided 396,436 to 271,786, or a majority of
124,650, in favor of repeal of the Sunday blue laws.6 9 And the
following year, the legislature gave effect to this expressed will of the
people.70
Other Provisions
Still law in Wisconsin, however, is a provision adopted in 1919' 1
which requires every employer of labor, "who owns or operates any
factory or mercantile establishment in this state," to allow every
employed person "at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in
every seven consecutive days. '17 2 But this does not apply in certain
specified instances, such as emergencies, or to certain personnel, such
as janitors and watchmen.73  The Industrial Commission has the
authority and duty to enforce these provisions.7 4
Thus, today in Wisconsin, any person may work on Sunday pro-
vided he is allowed to rest twenty-four consecutive hours during the six
days next ensuing. The fact that there has been no litigation before the
Supreme Court concerning this section indicates that the "one day of rest
in seven" requirement is widely accepted. The Attorney General has had
occasion to hold, however, that this section applies to gasoline filling
N.W. 1064 (1904) ; Ainsworth v. Williams, 111 Wis. 17, 86 N.W. 551 (1901) ;
Williams v. Lane, 87 Wis. 152, 58 N.W. 77 (1894); Cohn v. Heimbauch,
86 Wis. 176, 56 N.W. 638 (1893); Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
83 Wis. 271, 50 N.W. 497 (1892); Vinz v. Beatty, 61 Wis. 645, 21 N.W. 787
(1884); Troewert v. Decker, 51 Wis. 46, 8 N.W. 26 (1881).
68 Wis. Laws, Jt. Res. No. 114 (1931).
69 WIscoNsIN BLUE BOOK 221 (1946).
70Wis. Laws ch. 74 (1933).
71 Wis. Laws ch. 653 (1919).
72 WIs. STAT. sec. 351.50(1) (1951). "This shall not authorize any work on
Sunday not now authorized by law." Ibid.7
3 WIs. STAT. sec. 351.50(2) (1951).
4 WIs. STAT. secs. 351.50(3) and 351.50(3m) (1951). See, also, 15 Ops. Wis.
A-r'r'Y GEN. 396 (1926) and Wisconsin Red Book 242 (1950). For information
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stations,75 to a stone quarry and a shipyard, 6 and an electric power
plant,7" but does not apply to the state or its political subdivisions, as
employers."
The Wisconsin statutes also provide that "no court shall be open or
transact any business on the first day of the week" or certain specified
holidays.70 Thus, when any contract matures on a Sunday it will be
held to mature on the next secular day. 0 And a justice of the peace
may not set bail on a Sunday.81
Although not strictly an issue concerning Sunday law, a Milwaukee
district attorney posed a similar question to Attorney General Finnegan
in 1936. The latter was asked whether orthodox Hebrews might be
permitted to vote as absentee voters prior to election day, April 7th,
since their religious precepts prohibited them from voting during the
week in which the elections take place, as this was their religious holiday
season. In replying affirmatively, the Attorney General said:
"In the interests of good citizenship every effort should be
made to so construe the statutes as not to deprive an elector of
the right to vote, merely on account of his religious beliefs,
sincerely entertained, which make it impossible for him to vote
on the particular day set for an election, and we are reluctant
to read into the statutes any legislative intent to deny such voter
this important franchise. '82
on enforcement, see file docket C1414 in the .official and correspondence files
of the Industrial Commission, State Office Bldg., Madison.
7519 OPs. Wis. Arr'y GEM. 360 (1930).
76 19 OPs. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 501 (1930).
77 27 OPs. Wis. A'r'y GEN. 493 (1938). That orders come "bunched up" does
not create an "emergency" within the meaning of the exception of this
section. 11 OPs. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 119 (1922).78 8 OPS. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 749 (1919).
79 WIs. STAT. sec. 265.15 (1951), originally created by Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 87,
sec. 18 (1849). But "in case of exigency an injunction may be granted and
80 . served on Sunday." Wis. S9AT. 268.04 (1951). See, supra note 53.
Ws. STAT. sec. 265.15 (1951). See Dax and Tibbs, Arrest Search and Seizure
11 (Milwaukee, 1950).
8126 OPs. Wis. A-r'Y GEN. 185 (1937). Pertaining to judicial proceedings on
legal holidays, see, also, Green v. Walker, 73 Wis. 548, 41 N.W. 534 (1889);
Well v. Geier, 61 Wis. 414, 21 N.W. 246 (1884) ; Lampe v. Manning, 38 Wis.
673 (1875).
8225 OPs. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 225, 226 (1936). "While it may well be that
additional legislation more specifically providing for cases of the sort here
under consideration should be provident, we feel it our duty to give the
existing language of the statutes the very broadest possible construction to
the end that the right of suffrage be not in effect denied on account of
religious beliefs." Id. at 227. It is significant to note that the absentee voting
statute has since been amended to permit absentee voting by those who
cannot appear at the polling place because of "religious reasons." WIs. STAT.
sec. 11.54 (1951). Under Wis. STAT. sec. 256.17, both the governor and the
president may designate a day of thanksgiving and both days designated are
legal holidays. 28 Ops. Wis. ArT'Y GEM. 605 (1939). Among the general
court provisions (Wis. Stat. ch. 256) December 25 is a legal holiday. On
Good Friday, moreover, "the period from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. shall uniformly
be observed for the purpose of worship. . . .Whenever any of said days
shall fall on Sunday the succeeding Monday shall be the legal holiday."
Wis. STAT. sec. 256.17 (1951).
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Among the miscellaneous statutory provisions pertaining to Sunday
observance, presently in effect, is that forbidding any boxing or sparring
exhibition on that day. 3 "No prisoner shall be compelled to work on.
Sunday," moreover, "except it be on necessary household work or when
necessary to maintain the management or discipline of the institution." 84
Except for active military service, in case of necessity, no Wiscofisin
national guard troops may be transported on Sunday.85 Still in effect
is the provision that forbids the serving of any civil process on Sunday,8"
although legal notices may be published on that day. 7 Furthernore,
where the day, or the last day, for doing any acf concerning negotiable
instruments which is required or permitted by statute to be done, falls
on Sunday, "the act may be done on the next succeeding secular ...
day."88
Although there would seem to be no substantial need for so pro-
viding, since the Sunday blue lawi were repealed, the statutes still
assert that any person, who conscientiously believes that a day other
than Sunday ought to be observed as the Sabbath, may perform secular
business and labor on Sunday.8 9
Some public pressure still exists to effect a return to Sunday blue
laws in Wisconsin. For instance, present law provides local option so
that a community can close taverns for any -period the local voters
choose.90 Moreover, wholesale or retail liquor stores holding "Class B"
licenses are required by state law to be closed between 3:30 a.m. and
10 a.m. on Sunday.91 But on March 19, 1953, the Wisconsin Assembly
killed a bill "by a resounding voice vote" which sought to require
Sunday tavern closings. The bill was introduced by Assemblyman
Milford C. Kintz, Republican of Richland Center, and had drawn
support from clergy and temperance leaders in a public hearing before
the Assembly Excise and Fees Committee. The Committee had recom-
mended killing the bill. Assemblyman Kintz spoke briefly against the
Committee action upon the Assembly floor, but was unable to muster
the required seconds to obtain a roll-call vote.92
83 Wis. STAT. sec. 169.11 (1951). A religious organization that charges ad-
mission to a boxing tournament is not exempt from license provisions of
ch. 169, Stats. 25 Ops. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 260 (1936).
84 WIS. STAT. sec. 56.22 (1951).
85 Wis. STAT. sec. 21.09 (1951).
86 Wis. STAT. sec. 331.29 (1951).
87 WIS. STAT. sec. 33127 (1951).
88 Wis. STAT. secs. 116.01 (15) and sec. 117.03 (1951).
89 WIs. STAT. sec. 351.52 (1951).
9 0 Wis. STAT. sec. 176.38 (1951).
" WIS. STAT. sec. 176.05(6) (a) (1951). "Any person who holds a license or
permit to manufacture, rectify or sell intoxicating liquor at wholesale or,
who is the holder of a winery license may sell sacramental wine direct to
ministers of the gospel, priests. rabbis or religious organizations for sacra-
mental use exclusively." Wis. STAT. sec. 176.05(lg) (1951). See, infra, note
116.
92 The Madison Capital Times, March 19, 1953, p. 1, col. 8.
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It would seem that present-day Wisconsin is far removed from the
recurrence of Sunday blue laws.
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES
Religious liberty is not absolute in Wisconsin. It must exist in
relation to reasonable exercises of the state's police power. The para-
mount question involved in any discussion of religion and the police
power is one mainly of liberty versus authority, a controversy long
familiar to every social scientist generally, and every political scientist
specifically. Where has the boundary line been drawn between the police
power and religious freedom? Important new answers to this question
have been rendered by the United States Supreme Court in the Jehovah's
Witnesses cases of recent years.93 And this sect, otherwise known as the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, has also been instrumental in
having such a line drawn by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
A Matter of Faith
The Witnesses' many quarrels with the police power are traceable to
their remarkably unique manner in practicing their faith and their literal
interpretation of the Biblical injunction:
"Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not
make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing
that is in Heaven above, or that is in the water under the earth.
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them: for
I the Lord thy God am a jealous God...04
Hence, as a matter of faith, they object to saluting the flag,95 to govern-
mental licensing and permit regulations, and other signs of obeisance
to civil authority. Requirements for securing a municipal permit to
solicit contributions, distribute their literature, or obtain the use of a
public park are viewed as offending their religious conscience and
precepts.
"Followers of . . . Charles Taze Russell and . . . Joseph
Frederick Rutherford, they are serene in their belief that the
second coming of Christ is due momentarily, that there is no
93 The cases began in 1937 and are discussed in the following: STROUP, THE JE-
I-OVAH'S WITNESS (New York. 1945); FELLMAN, Separation of Church and
State in the United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 435-9;
PRITCHErr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 91-101 (New York, 1948); Barber, Religious
Liberty v. Police Power: Jehovah's Witnesses, 41 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 226-47
(1947); Waite, The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses, 28
MINN. L. REv. 209 (1944); Heller, A Turning Point for Religious Liberty,
29 VA. L. REV. 440 (1943); Rotnem and Folsom, Recent Restrictions Upon
Religious Liberty, 36 Am. POL. ScI. REV. 1053 (1942). See, also, Solie,
Freedom of Speech and Religion Versus Property Rights-Jehovah's Wit-
nesses in Company Town, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 121-5.
94Exodus 20:3-5. Seemingly incompatible verses, often cited in answer by
Christians of other denominations, may be found in Romans 13:7, I Peter
2:17, and Numbers 2:2.
95 For discussion of the flag-salute cases, see: JOHNSON AND Yosr, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 175-86.
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time to build churches and that the 'witness work' must be
carried on by the direct method of calling on people in their
homes, distributing pamphlets and playing records on portable
phonographs describing their publications and beliefs for the
edification of whomsoever will listen. . . A variation of the
phonograph technique is for the Witness to offer to leave books
and pamphlets and to request a 'contribution,' which may or may
not be in proportion to the cost of the printed matter. The
Witnesses are very clear on this point-their 'literature' is not
sold; it is given freely, as is the reciprocal contribution in the
amount set by the donor's conscience. This point has an obvious
bearing on the commercial (as contrasted with the religious)
nature of these transactions-a matter of importance when the
Witnesses disobey a city official's demand that they take out
permits before peddling or soliciting as is required of other
itinerant salesmen of books or merchandise." 96
Distribution of Literature
In Milwaukee v. Snyder,9" Harol F. Snyder was arrested for
violating an ordinance which made it "unlawful for any person.., to
circulate or distribute any circular, handbills, cards, posters, dodgers or
other printed or advertising matter.., in or upon any sidewalk, street
or alley ... within the city of Milwaukee." 98 Snyder, who was acting
as a picket, stood in the street in front of a meat market and distributed
to passing pedestrians handbills which set forth the position of
organized labor in its dispute with the meat market, and asked citizens
to refrain from patronizing it. Some of the bills were thrown in the
street by the pedestrians, but only Snyder, the distributor, was arrested,
according to the policy of the police department. The Milwaukee County
court found Snyder guilty and fined him.
Upon appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Snyder relied on
Lovell v. Griffin99 in which a handbill ordinance had been declared
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in violation of
free speech and press and freedom of religion of the First Amendment
as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 0 0 But that case does not apply here, said
96 Barber, Religious Liberty v. Police Power: Jehovah's Witnesses, 41 Am. POL.
Scr. REv. 226-7 (1947).
97230 Wis. 131. 283 N.W. 301 (1939). A brief was filed by Osmond K.
Fraenkel of New York City and Perry J. Stearns of Milwaukee, attorneys
for the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., as amicus curiae.
98 Milwaukee Code of Ordinances, see. 865. See, note, Constitutionality of
Milwaukee Handbill Ordinance, 23 MARQ. L. Rlv. 214 (1939).
99303 U.S. 444 (1938).
100 Snyder's claim alleged that the Lovell case in effect overruled City of
Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N.W. 352 (1931) whereby the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the same ordinance against the claim that
it violated freedom of speech and press. In declaring the ordinance reason-
able, the Court said: "It is of course quite readily to be conceded that if
the enforcement of this ordinance were shown to have been directed at a
class of persons for the purpose of suppressing the free expression of their
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Judge Fowler for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, because no religious
issue is involved in the instant case. In the Lovell case, on the other
hand, a Jehovah's Witness was required to be licensed by the city
manager before the handbills could be distributed. The ordinance in the
Lovell case, therefore, was "manifestly not aimed to prevent the littering
of streets, as was the instant ordinance." 101
"The construction of the Milwaukee ordinance, as held by our
state court, is binding upon the federal courts, so far as its aim
or purpose is concerned. The purpose of the ordinance would
not, of course, except it from operation of the freedom of speech,
press, and religion provisions of the United States constitution,
or from the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment thereto
if it were enforced in a discriminatory manner. . . . But the
instant ordinance was found in the instant case not to have been
so enforced .... 1102
The United States Supreme Court granted Snyder's petition for
review by issuing a writ of certiorari. 0 3 The Snyder case gained
religious significance insofar as the Supreme Court rendered one de-
cision disposing of four similar cases: Schneider z. State, involving a
Jehovah's Witness, Young v. California, Nichols v. Massachusetts, and
Snyder v. Milwaukee, the instant case.10 4
In the Young case, Young had been convicted for distributing hand-
bills giving notice of a meeting of the "Friends Lincoln Brigade," at
which speakers would discuss the war in Spain, in violation of the
prohibited classification of commercial advertising in the Los Angeles
handbill ordinance. In the Nichols case, Nichols had been convicted for
distributing leaflets announcing a protest meeting, in connection with the
administration of state unemployment insurance, in violation of a
Worcester, Massachusetts ordinance.
In the Schneider case, an ordinance of the Town of Irvington, New
Jersey, was involved, providing:
"No person ... shall canvass, solicit, distribute circulars or other
matter, or call from house to house .. .without first having
reported to and received a written permit from the Chief of
Police ......
And it was further provided that the permit set forth the time it was
views, rather than for the purpose of preventing the littering of the public
streets, quite a different question would be presented." 203 Wis. at 388-9, 234
N.W. at 354. -See, also, Mittleman v. ,Nash Sales, Inc., 202 Wis. 577,'
232 N.W. 527 (1930). For discussion of Wisconsin cases and statutes
concerning picketing in labor disputes, see: Lampert, The Wisconsin Emn-
ployinent Peace Act, 1946 Wis. L. REv. 193; Note, Peaceful Picketing and
Unfair Labor Practices, 27 MARQ. L. REv. 145 (1943).
101 230 Wis. at 135, 283 N.W. at 303.
102 230 Wis. at 135-6, 283 N.W. at 303.
103 306 U.S. 629 (1939).
104308 U.S. 147 (1939).
[Vol. 37
RELIGION AND POLICE POWER
to be used, the applicant's name, age, height, weight, place of birth,
arrest and criminal record, clothing worn, and description of his project.
Fingerprints and photographs were also required. The police chief was
vested with the discretion, moreover, to refuse the application if he
found the applicant was "not of good character or is canvassing for a
project not free from fraud." Schneider, a Jehovah's Witness, did not
apply for a permit for the reason that it would be "an act of disobedience
to the command of Almighty God ;" and Bible passages were cited to
show the obligation so to preach God's word.
The United States Supreme Court divided 8 to 1 in reversing the
state courts in each instance, with Justice McReynolds dissenting alone
without opinion. Relying on the Lovell case, which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court distinguished in denying Snyder's claim, Justice Roberts
held for the majority that the municipal ordinances were unconstitu-
tional because the "freedom of speech and of the press secured by the
First Amendment . . . against abridgment by the United States is
similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth against abridgment
by a state."
"Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest
of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these may
not abridge the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to
those who wish to speak, write, print or circulate information or
opinion." 0 5
Against the argument that, under the Milwaukee ordinance, the dis-
tributor is arrested only if those who receive the literature throw it on
the streets, Justice Roberts replied:
"But, even as thus construed, the ordinance cannot be enforced
without unconstitutionally abridging the liberty of free speech.
As we have pointed out, the public convenience in respect of
cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the
police power which invades the free communication of informa-
tion and opinion secured by the Constitution."' 06
Although the Snyder litigation, itself, did not concern a religious
issue involving Jehovah's Witnesses, what was said by the United States
Supreme Court in disposing of it, along with a Jehovah's Witness case,
wbuld apply to the distribution of handbills in Wisconsin by a Jehovah's
Witness or any other person for that matter. In discussing this, among
other cases "in which issues of freedom of the press were merged with
issues of freedom of religion," one authority has declared:
"We owe a debt of gratitude to the Jehovah's Witnesses,
whose fanatical resistance to even the mildest governmental
regulation has brought to the Supreme Court some twenty-five
'05 308 U.S. at 160.
106 308 U.S. at 163.
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cases in the decision of which the constitutional law of religious
liberty has been established." 107
But there is a limit to religious liberty, even for members of the
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society. In the Wisconsin case, City of
Washburn v. Ellquist,0 8 a Jehovah's Witness was arrested for violating
a City of Washburn ordinance which required prior registration and
licensing of hawkers and solicitors with the city clerk. Ellquist's offense
was the fact that he went from door to door, unlicensed, offering books
and pamphlets in return for requested contributions of from 5 to 25
cents. Sometimes he left literature without receiving a contribution.
"How far can a municipality reach out and not violate the constitutional
provision of freedom of the press and freedom of religion ?"-Judge
Barlow stated the issue for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
"Certainly no one would question the right of a city to require
a religious organization to comply with reasonable building
codes and zoning ordinances in the construction of a church
building. Is there any more reason to question its right to require
appellant to give his name, address, and to disclose the fact that
he is distributing religious literature, when it is in the interest of
the community that the proper authorities should have this
information?. .. "109
The answer was obvious to the Court. This was a reasonable
exercise of the police power for the protection of the welfare of the
community.
"It is conceivable that undesirable persons may enter com-
munities and possibly represent themselves to be ordained by the
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, and members of this
society would justly resent this condition and would undoubtedly
seek the assistance of law enforcement authorities. Government
and courts are necessary to protect the constitutional rights con-
tended for by appellant. The rights of a municipality must also
be protected by the same courts that protect the rights of
appellant."'1 °
What Judge Barlow was saying, in effect, was that the age-old
question of liberty versus authority, as reflected in the present issue of
religious liberty versus the police power, is not always to be resolved in
favor of liberty, especially when the authority of the state does not
unreasonably restrict the liberty of the individual. Here there is no
discriminatory power in the hands of the clerk. No fee or tax is
involved. No religious test is imposed; and no unreasonable delay is
107 Cushman, Ten Years of the Supreme Court: 1937-1947, 42 Am. POL. ScI.
REv. 47 (1948).208242 Wis. 609, 9 N.W.2d 121 (1943), rehearing denied, 242 Wis. 616a,
10 N.W.2d 292 (1943).
109 242 Wis. at 613, 9 N.W.2d at 123.
110 242 Wis. at 614, 9 N.W.2d at 123.
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entailed. The distinguishing feature that makes this ordinance reason-
able and valid is that under it:
"The duty of the public official is mandatory; he has no power
of discrimination; he performs a ministerial act, and the argu-
ment.., that the official may refuse to issue the permit... is too
remote and speculative to give it serious consideration." '
Religious Assembly
Few states could boast such explicit constitutional guaranties of the
freedom of religious assembly as those provided by the Wisconsin
Constitution:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press.1 1 2
"The right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . shall
never be abridged.113
"The right of every man to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed;
* .. nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of
conscience be permitted .... 114
As if these provisions were not enough, the Wisconsin statutes make it
unlawful for any person, at any time, to "wilfully interrupt or molest
any assembly or meeting of people for religious worship or for other
purposes, lawfully and peaceably assembled."" 5 This provision almost
duplicates language in the statutes of the Wisconsin Territory of 1839,1
and has been in force constantly since that time.
111 Ibid. See file docket C1281 in the main files of Industrial Commission, Madi-
son. for memorandum of Sept. 13, 1940, discussing details of arrest and im-
prisonment of six members of a family of Jehovah's Witnesses for distribut-
ing literature in Two Rivers, Wisconsin, without licenses. The Commission's
interest apparently was based on the fact that two minor girls of the group
did not have street grade permits issued by the Commission.2 2WIs. CONST. ART. I, sec. 3. The circulation by bishops of the Roman
Catholic Church of a pastoral letter, forbidding the members of that church
to keep or read a certain newspaper, but not requiring the breach of any
contract nor the withholding of any advertising patronage, was held to be
within the scope of church discipline, and not to be in violation of this
section. Kuryer Publishing Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948(1916).
113 Wis. CONST. ART. I, sec. 4.
114 WIs. CONsT. ART. I. sec. 18.
115 Wis. STAT. sec. 351.53 (1951). See, Wis. STAT. sec. 347.04 (1951) for
definition of unlawful assembly. See, also, Heller, Freedom. of Assembly,
25 MARQ. L. Rxv. 1 (1940); Werner, Freedom of Speech and Assembly,
10 Wis. L. REv. 298 (1935).
1'6 WISCONSIN TERRITORIAL STATUTES 367 (1839). Wis. STAT. sec. 351.54 (1951)
restricts the selling of intoxicating liquor "within two miles of any camp
meeting or other religious assembly." Wis. STAT. sec. 176.05(9m) (1951)
forbids the issuance of a retail "Class A" or "Class B" liquor license "for
premises less than 300 feet from any established public school, parochial
school, hospital or church." See, supra note 91. Services conducted by
"Holy Rollers" are no violation of Wisconsin criminal laws. 12 Ops. Wis.
AT'VY GEN. 29 (1923).
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State ex rel. Garrabad v. Dering,"17 a neglected forerunner of some
modem Jehovah's Witnesses cases, concerned the validity of a City of
Portage ordinance which made it unlawful for
"any person or persons, society, association, or organization...
to march or parade ... upon [certain named streets], shouting,
singing, or beating drums or tambourines, or playing upon any
other musical instrument or instruments, for the purpose of
advertising or attracting attention of the public, or to the disturb-
ance of the public peace or quiet."
without first obtaining permission from the mayor. The provision was
not to apply to funerals, fire companies, regularly organized companies
of the state militia, or "any political party having a regular state
organization." Garrabad, a member of the Salvation Army, was im-
prisoned for violation of this ordinance." 8
Before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a habeas corpus proceeding,
Garrabad claimed that the ordinance was state action denying him the
equal protection of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Equal protection w~s denied, he insisted,
for the reason that fire companies, the militia, and political parties are
arbitrarily exempted, and that the mayor has the discriminatory
authority to issue permission.
The Supreme Court agreed. Through Judge Pinney, it declared:
"It cannot be maintained that any ... society [has] any right
for religious purposes or as religious bodies to use the streets for
purposes of public parade because the purpose in view is purely
religious and not secular, but they certainly have the same right to
equal protection of the laws as secular organizations.""1 9
This ordinance resembles the means of imposing a "petty tyranny,"
and appears to be more "the result of prejudice, bigotry, and intolerance,
than any fair or legitimate provision in due exercise of the police
power." Judge Pinney characterized it further as "entirely un-
American," which is "in conflict with the principles of our institutions
zind all modern ideas of civil liberty."'"02 And he concluded:
"The people do not hold rights as important and as well settled
as the right to assemble and have public parades and pro-
cessions ... in support of any laudable or lawful cause, subject
to the power of any public officer to interdict or prevent them."' 2
Although written sixty years ago, Judge Pinney's opinion could have
117 84 Wis. 585, 54 N.W. 1104 (1893).
I's "A large place in the Army's endeavors is given to music and song. In every
country the band-usually a brass band-is a feature of the Army work.
The strains of such a band, reaching farther than the human voice, draw
members within earshot of the Army's message who would otherwise not
be attracted." 19 ENcYcLOPEDiA BRiTANNICA 913 (1946).119 84 Wis. at 591, 54 'N.W. at 1106.
120 84 Wis. at 594-5, 54 N.W. at 1107.
21 84 Wis. at 595, 54 N.W. at 1108.
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been written yesterday. If states modem law on the subject and is
worthy of being referred to as basic and parent authority in support
of the right to worship curiously in Wisconsin.
The recent Jehovah's Witness case of Milwaukee County v. Carter"2 2
is the only other religious assembly decision in Wisconsin's experience.
Carter, presiding minister of the South Unit of Milwaukee Congregation
of Jehovah's Witnesses, filed an application with the Milwaukee County
Park. Commission for permission to hold a series of public meetings in
the South Shore Park, a public park under the Commission's juris-
diction. The Commission denied the application for the reason that the
meetings would constitute religious services in the park in violation of
the county ordinance which provided:
"No service or demonstration by any organization, creed or
sect, excepting only nondenominational or interdenominational
Easter sunrise services, shall be allowed within the limits of any
park~or parkway of Milwaukee county. This shall not be con-
strued to forbid the offering of an invocation, prayer, or hymn in
connection with church picnics or other similar gatherings." 2 3
Regardless of the Commission's ruling, the Congregation assembled
in the park for a meeting "at a convenient place situated so that it in no
way interfered with the ordinary use of the park for recreational
purposes by other persons." The statement of facts continued:
"The defendant, David Carter, was assigned to address the
assembly... and he began addressing them on the subject, 'The
Two Great Commandments of Life,' and used a sound amplify-
ing system to reach the audience. The amplification of his voice
did not annoy or disturb anyone. His talk was based upon...
the Bible. His manner was not boisterous and his speech and
tone of voice were suitable and appropriate, and his attitude was
kindly. He did not excite anyone to violence or unlawful acts,
and no one in the audience or in the park for recreation was
annoyed or offended at anything he said or did....
Carter was convicted for violating the ordinance by Judge Steffes
of the Municipal Court of Milwaukee County. Judge Steffes reasoned
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution did not create "a license for particular sectarian organiza-
tions for the dissemination of religious beliefs in organized form to
utilize tax-supported public property for those purposes."'12 5 And he
based his decision upon that clause of the Wisconsin Constitution which
forbids public funds being expended for religious purposes.126 And the
122 258 Wis. 139,45 N.W.2d 90 (1950).
123 MILW. Co. ORD. §47.02 (6).
124 258 Wis. at 142, 45 N.W.2d at 91.
125 258 Wis. at 142-3, 45 N.W.2d at 92.
126 WIs. CoNsT., ART. I, sec. 18.
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Wisconsin Bible reading decision, State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board
of Edgerton,127 definitely held that the use of public property for
sectarian purposes was prohibited by that clause.
Upon Carter's appeal, Chief Justice Fritz agreed for the unanimous
Wisconsin Supreme Court that
"it is well-established law in this state that neither tax-supported
public-school property nor funds so raised for public-school
purposes can be used for sectarian ... purposes... However...
no such restriction is considered applicable under the recent
decisions of the United States supreme court to the use of public
parks or streets by the people in their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble in the free and orderly exercise of their
religion and the freedom of speech, and of the press, as provided
in the First amendment to the United States constitution. 128
Saia v. New York 29 is controlling here. In that case the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an ordinance which prohibited the
use of sound amplifiers in public places except with permission of the
chief of police. Saia, a Jehovah's Witness, gave lectures in a public
park, and, when a permit was refused him, he used sound equipment
without a permit. And Chief Justice Fritz cited Justice Douglas' con-
curring opinion to the effect that the Court must give preferred
treatment to freedom of speech and religion.
The Chief Justice then turned his attention specifically to the Wis-
consin Constitution. He said:
"When, in sec. 3, art. I, the Wisconsin constitution guarantees
the right of free speech, it does not exempt or restrict speech
on the subject of religion and, if it should, such restriction would
be void because in conflict with and subordinate to .. . the
United States constitution ... Speech on religious topics is just
as free, and no freer, under the constitution as speech on other
subjects and on no subject is it free from reasonable regulation
to insure public order and safety and to reconcile the exercise of
this right with the simultaneous enjoyment of equally sacred
rights by others."'' 30
But the ordinance here not only regulates but prohibits speech on
religious subjects.' 3' And Chief Justice Fritz concluded by cogently
defining the lawful sphere of the police power with respect to the right
of assembly. "Government may," he said, "in the interests of public
order, safety, and the equitable sharing of facilities, exercise reasonable
12776 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).
128 258 Wis. at 144, 45 N.W.2d at 92.
129 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
130 258 Wis. at 145-6, 45 N.W.2d at 93.
131 "Sec. 47.02(2) of the ordinance provides: 'No sermon, discussion, harangue,
or speech shall be delivered' by any person for political purposes or in
connection with the sale of any article or which constitute a public criticism
or abuse of any religious organization or representative thereof.'" Ibid.
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control over when, where, and under what conditions public meetings
may be held on public property; but to deny to the people all the use
of the people's property for the public discussion of specified subjects is
an unconstitutional interference of rights expressly guaranteed by both
state and federal constitutions."' 32
Neither the trial court nor the Wisconsin Supreme Court mentioned
the Garrabad case. But the Carter and Garrabad decisions, taken
together, appear to point to the conclusion that any Wisconsin govern-
mental action alleged to abridge freedom of religious assembly will be
presumed unconstitutional by the Wisconsin Supreme Court until every
doubt is clearly removed.
Jehovah's Witnesses in Wisconsin, no less than elsewhere, have
been successful in creating state constitutional law that favors religious
liberty in its conflict with the police power."33
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY
The police power of the state encompasses the power to enact
reasonable laws and regulations for the preservation of the public health
and safety. That state governments have the authority to enact vacci-
nation laws and health laws of every description is well settled. 34 In
fact, the police power of the states has been successfully challenged in
but few cases where matters of public health have been at issue.
3
5
Often challenges are made on religious grounds.
At issue in State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge136 was a vaccination order
of the State Board of Health requiring all Wisconsin school children to
present a certificate of vaccination in order to be permitted to attend any
public or private school. A Christian Scientist petitioned the circuit
court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Beloit school board to admit
132 Ibid.
133 Another case involving a Jehovah's Witness in Wisconsin was the federal
case of United States v. Mroz, 136 F.2d 221 (1943). Mroz, although
classified as a conscientious objector by the Milwaukee selective service draft
board, refused to comply with an order to report to a camp for conscientious
objectors on the ground that he was a "Minister" and should have had
exempt status. He was prosecuted and convicted in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Upon his appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals, 7th Circuit, his conviction was affirmed. Circuit Judge Evans
said for the Court: "At once the question arises. What is meant by the
word 'minister'? Surely it could hardly be said that every Jehovah's Witness,
because he 'has made a covenant with God,' is a minister within the meaning
of the statute. The officers of the Jehovah's Witnesses did not so construe
the word 'minister.' Neither did the Government. Nor do we." 136 F.2d at
266. To the same effect is United States v. Gormly, 136 F.2d 227 (1943).
See, also, McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12 MARQ. L. REv.
138 (1928).
34 See, for instance, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) ; Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
135 One such exceptional case was Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926),
where the Court held that the use of shoddy, properly sterilized, might not
be prohibited in the making of comfortables.
136 95 Wis. 390, 70 N.W. 347 (1897).
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his children without the certificate. The petitioner, according to the
statement of facts,
"refused to allow his children to be vaccinated, and said children
refused to be vaccinated, on account of their belief, as Christian
Scientists, that the operation or treatment of vaccination was
morally wrong, and that the laws of God permit no such operation
or treatment, and that to permit it is a breaking of such laws ......
The circuit court granted the writ, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed for the reason that the Board of Health had no existing
statutory authority to issue such an order. The religious issue was not
discussed by the Court. The Board's rule was void, because
"the fatal vice of the rule ... is that there was no precedent or
existing law under which it could be framed and adopted as an
adjunct or act of administrative authority, to effectuate its pur-
poses and carry it into effect."'13
7
Ten years later, in 1907, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a measure
which required that each local board of health "shall forthwith" prohibit
attendance at school, upon the appearance of smallpox, except persons
who presented proof of successful vaccination. 138 The legislature
attempted to accomplish, therefore, what the State Board of Health had
previously failed to accomplish.
In 1908, Dr. C. A. Harper, Secretary of the State Board of Health,
asked Attorney General Gilbert whether this 1907 provision applied to
parochial or sectarian schools.'3 9 The Attorney General replied that
since the law was not a penal statute, it must be construed liberally.
And since its purpose is to preserve public health and safety by prevent-
ing the spread of smallpox, it was his opinion that compulsory vaccina-
tion applied to parochial or sectarian schools.
"The law being for the protection of children and the public in
general, it would be robbed of much of its force and effect if
parochial and sectarian schools in cities could not be regarded as
coming within its provisions. I do not think that such a super-
visory jurisdiction over parochial schools can be regarded as an
infringement upon the rights and liberties of the children
attending said schools or their parents. While parochial and
sectarian schools are not mentioned in said law by name, still
the police power is so broad that in cases of necessity and
emergency public gatherings of even adults may be prohibited,
when public health and safety demand it."'' 4
The Attorney General has since interpreted the statute as not per-
mitting a local board of education legally to make a rule requiring vacci-
137 95 Wis. at 402, 70 N.W. at 350.
138 Wis. Laws ch. 113 (1907), now Wis. STAT. sec. 143.13 (1951).
139 REPr. OF ATr'Y GEN. 340 (1908).
140 Id. at 341.
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nation before attendance at school.24 1 Only a local board of health has
such authority, which extends to private and parochial, as well as public,
schools.'
14 2
An 1898 legislative provision, granting discretionary authority to
the Board of Health for the quarantine and disinfection "of persons,
localities and things infected" and "for the proper sanitary care of jails,
asylums, schoolhouses, hotels and all other public buildings,"'4 3 was
construed by the Attorney General in 1908 to include parochial schools
in Wisconsin. 4 4 A parochial school building is not a public building in
the sense that it is controlled and owned by public authority for public
use. But it is used and frequented by the public, as in the case of hotels.
"A parochial school is used for the purpose of public instruction
and it is my opinion that it is a public building in the sense in
which the term is used in the statute. ... "145
It follows that public expenditures for the protection of health and
safety in church-connected institutions, which are used and frequented
by the public, do not constitute the drawing of money from the
treasury for sectarian or religious purposes, as expressly forbidden by
the Wisconsin Constitution. 146
In 1949, the question was presented to Attorney General Fairchild
whether compulsory physical examinations of entering students at the
1414 Ops. Wis. AT'Y GEN. 70 (1915).
1424 Oss. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 383 (1915).
143 WIS. STAT. sec. 1408 (1898), now Wis. STAT. sec. 143.12 (1951).
144 RFPT. OF ATr'Y GEN. 650 (1908).
145 Id. at 651.
146 Summer camps operated by churches for educational or recreational purposes,
and which limit attendance to members, are not "tourist rooming houses"
requiring permits from the state board of health to operate within the
meaning of sec. 160.01(4), Stats., unless such camps furnish sleeping accom-
modations to the general public, such as transients and tourists. 35 Oss. Wis.
ATr'Y GEN. 449 (1946). A county board, therefore, may not appropriate
money to aid children to attend summer camps owned by private individuals,
for this would constitute an unconstitutional public expenditure for a private
purpose. 11 OPs. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 416 (1922). Similarly, a county board
has no power to appropriate money for charitable institutions, such as the
Salvation Army [23 Ops. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 832 (1934)], or the Y.M.C.A. or
Y.W.C.A. for the purpose of furnishing welfare services and entertainment
to members of the armed forces of the United States. 33 OPs. Wis. ATr'Y
GEN. 51 (1944). See, also, 2 OPs. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 189 (1913). But the state
superintendent of public property may make free distribution of certain
public documents to Marquette University. 4 Ops. Wis. Ar'y GEN. 990
(1915). See, also, 21 OPs. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 727 (1932) which held that a
hospital built in part by county funds could be transferred by deed with a
condition subsequent, or by valid lease, to a Catholic sisterhood or other
religious body to be maintained as a public nonsectarian hospital without
violating ART. I, sec. 18, WIs. CONST., or the rule that "a county has no
authority to raise by taxation moneys for other than a public purpose or for
the benefit of private individuals or private societies. . . . Thus, the deed
should contain . . . a clause that the title shall revert in case the property is
used for different purposes. If the deed contains a forfeiture clause, it will
be construed to be a condition subsequent and will restrict the property to
the uses specified in the deed," Id. at 729.
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Milwaukee State Teachers College infringed the religious rights of
members of an undesignated religious society. 147 The Attorney General
replied:
"I assume without question that no religious tests of any
character are imposed in connection with the physical examina-
tions . . . and while the rights guaranteed under the first and
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution and under
secs. 18 and 19, art. I, Wisconsin constitution, should be jealously
guarded, it must at the same time be kept in mind that there is a
duty and an obligation on the part of the state to see that students
at its colleges are given proper protection in matters of health
from the ravages of such devastating diseases as tuberculosis or
other contagious maladies. Reasonable regulations directed to
that end by discovering the existence of such diseases through
required physical examinations appear to constitute without
doubt a reasonable exercise of the state's police power.' 148
It should be observed, however, that Wisconsin law provides that:
"None of the ... laws of the state regulating the practice of medicine
or healing shall be construed to interfere with the practice of Christian
Science, or with any person who administers to or treats the sick or
suffering by mental or spiritual means, nor shall any person who selects
such treatment for the cure of disease be compelled to submit to any
form of medical treatment.' 1 49 Christian Scientists must observe quar-
antine laws despite this section. 50 Thus, a Christian Science healer is
not a physician or clergyman so as to be authorized by statute' 5' to visit
a quarantined place without a written permit from a health officer.' 5 2
But persons, not authorized medical practitioners, who practice healing
through the use of Scriptures and the laying-on of hands, and even
make suggestions that patients drink grapejuice or olive oil or refrain
from eating certain foods, are exempt from the state medical laws so
long as no pecuniary considerations are involved.' 5 3
A 1913 Wisconsin law required any male applying for a marriage
14 38 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 220 (1949).
148Id. at 222-3. "Note . . . the words of the court in State ex rel. Weiss v.
District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 200, where Justice Lyon said: '. .. For example,
a Mormon may believe that the practice of polygamy is a religious duty; yet
no court would regard his conscience in that behalf for a moment, should
he put his belief into practice.'" Id. at 223.
149 Wis. STAT. sec. 147.19 (1951), originally Wis: Laws ch. 438, sec. 2 (1915);
see, also, Wis. STATS. secs. 102.42(1), 143.07(13), and 143.14(4) (1951).
150 5 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 642 (1916).
151See, WIS. STAT. sec. 143.05(4) (1951).
152 17 Ors. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 157 (1928); see, also, 7 O's. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 68
(1918).
153 17 OPs. Wis. AT-r'y GEN. 502 (1928). "Temporary medical relief," however,
as used in sec. 49.18(1), Stats., includes only care given by authorized
medical authorities, and does not include Christian Science or chiropractic
treatment, or mental or spiritual healing. 33 OPs. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 133
(1944), citing Reissmann v. Jelinski, 238 Wis. 462, 300 N.W. 164 (1941), and
disapproving 25 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 452 (1936).
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license to file a certificate that he was free from any venereal disease. 54
One Alfred Peterson asked four doctors to examine him in compliance
with the statute, but each refused on the ground that the statutory fee of
$3.00 was too low for a Wasserman test. Peterson then petitioned the
circuit court for Milwaukee County for a writ of mandamus to compel
the county clerk to issue him a marriage certificate. Circuit Court Judge
Eschweiler granted the writ and held the statute void for the reasons,
among others, that the fee was "unreasonably small" and that the
eugenics law violated religious rights provisions of Article I, section 18
of the Wisconsin Constitution. Upon appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Peterson v. Widule1 s5 the lower court's decision was reversed.
For a majority, Judge Winslow was emphatic in justifying the exertion
of the police power in this instance.
"The power of the state to control and regulate by reasonable
laws the marriage relation, and to prevent the contracting of
marriage by persons afflicted with loathsome or hereditary
diseases, which are liable either to be transmitted to the spouse or
inherited by the offspring, or both, must-on principle be regarded
as undeniable. Society has a right to protect itself from extinction
and its members from a fate worse than death."' 56
In regard to the religious issue, he said: "We have not been able to
appreciate the force of the contention that the law interferes in any
respect with religious liberty. We know of no church which desires its
ministers to profane the marriage tie by uniting a man afflicted with a
loathsome disease to an innocent woman."' 57 Judge Timlin, concurring,
also could not see how religious rights were infringed by the statute.
And he added: "The notion that marriage was a sacrament, not a civil
contract creating a status, once vigorously asserted, has long since
passed away."'15s
RELIGIOUs TESTS AND OATHS
In addition to the detailed provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution
adopted to secure the greatest measure of religious liberty in the state,
the framers stipulated in Article I, section 19, that
"No religious tests shall ever be required as a qualification for
any office of public trust under the state, and no person shall be
rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or
equity in consequence of his opinions on the subject of religion."
Two practices were thereby prohibited: religious tests for public offices,
and religious oaths as a requirement for the competency of witnesses.
154 WIS. STAT. sec. 2339m (1913) ; the relevant provision now is Wis. STAT. sec.
245.10 (1951).
155 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914).
156 157 Wis. at 647, 147 N.W. at 968.
'57 157 Wis. at 655-6, 147 N.W. at 971.
:15 157 Wis. at 670, 147 N.W. at 974. Judge Marshall, with whom Judge Vinje
concurred, dissented without mentioning the religious issue.
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Public Employment and Services
The legislature has specifically prohibited religious discrimination
in public employment with respect to Wisconsin civil servants and
public school teachers.
No question in any form to elicit information concerning the
religious opinions of a civil service applicant is permitted, either in his
application or examination. 5 9 It is further provided that: "No dis-
crimination shall be exercised, threatened, or promised, by any person
in the civil service against or in favor of any applicant, eligible, or
employe in the classified service because of his.., religious opinions or
affiliations." 160  On the basis of this latter limitation, therefore, the
only question that may legally be before the Civil Service Commission
concerning the removal of an employe is whether or not the reasons
assigned for his removal, on their face, are sufficient and are not
religious in character.' 6'
No questions may be asked concerning the religious affiliation of any
applicant for a teaching position in Wisconsin public schools, according
to express statutory provision, and no religious discrimination may be
practiced in their employment. 62 In 1936, Attorney General Finnegan
answered negatively to the question whether this statute violated the
free speech provisions of the United States and Wisconsin constitu-
tions. 6 3
Another legislative prohibition of religious discrimination relating to
"any office of a public trust" is that forbidding such discrimination in
the membership of the Wisconsin national guard, "notwithstanding any
rule or regulation prescribed by the federal government or any officer
or department thereof."'
1 64
159 WIs. STAT. sec. 16.14 (1951); see, also, Wis. STAT. sec. 16.11(1) (1951).
160 Wis. STAT. sec. 16.14 (1951).
161 13 Ops. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 238 (1924).
162 WIS. STAT. sec. 40.775 (1951).
163 25 OPs. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 376 (1936). With respect to the federal constitution,
the Attorney General relied on the doctrine "that the first ten amendments
to the United States constitution do not apply to the state governments but
only to the federal government." Id. at 377. This is no longer true insofar
as decisions by the United States Supreme Court since 1936 have conclusively
resulted in the application of the free speech and press provisions of the
First Amendment to state governments. The citations may be found in:
Fellman, Separation of Church and State in the United States: A Summary
View, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 427 at n. 4.
164 WIS. STAT. sec. 21.35 (1951). Chaplain applicants are required to state their
"denomination" in filling out the "Application for Federal Recognition as a
National Guard Officer and Warrant Officer . . ." War Department form
No. 62, which is used by the Wisconsin national guard. No other state forms
requiring religious designation have been found except that used by the
Department of Public Welfare entitled: "Application for Voluntary
Patient." The governing statute, in this instance, Wis. STAT. sec. 51.10 (1951),
contains no such requirement.
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Although the board of regents of the University of Wisconsin is
empowered to determine the "moral" qualifications of applicants for
admission, "no sectarian ... tests shall ever be allowed or exercised in
the appointment of regents or in the election of professors, teachers or
other officers of the university, or in the admission of students thereto
or for any purpose whatever."1 65 Similarly, the 1949 legislature pro-
vided that on child may be excluded from any public school on account
of his religion, and no "separate school or department shall be kept for
any person or persons on account of his religion. . ... -b
Private Action
Whether a private organization may impose a religious test as a
condition of membership was the issue in Barry v. Order of Catholic
Knights.6 7 The Order was incorporated under Wisconsin laws for the
benefit of Roman Catholics, and provided death benefits of $2,000 to
the beneficiaries of deceased members. As a condition for membership
its articles of incorporation provided that any member shall be expelled
from the Order and be deprived of all its benefits if he should cease to
be "a practical Catholic, or a communicant" of the Catholic Church.
Barry had agreed to this when he joined the Order, in 1885. In 1890,
however, he was married by a Protestant minister to a woman who had
not been legally divorced from her previous husband, a fact he did not
disclose to the Order. On learning this, in 1893, the Order expelled
Barry for the reason that his marriage by a Protestant minister had
automatically excommunicated him from the Church. Upon his death,
his widow commenced an action to require the Order to issue the death
benefit of $2,000 on the ground that its membership provisions were
contrary to Article I, sections 18 and 19 of the Wisconsin Constitution
which prohibit the imposition of religious tests and violation of one's
freedom of conscience.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this claim upon appeal. For
the Court, Judge Winslow said:
"The objection seems puerile. By these provisions no man's
conscience is coerced, nor his freedom of worship curtailed.
Membership is purely voluntary. If a man chooses to join an
organization having such requirements, and agrees that he shall
forfeit his right to benefits on failure to live up to them, he is at
liberty to do so. All men may make contracts as they choose, so
long as they be not contrary to law or public policy."' 68
165 Wis. STAT. sec. 36.06(1) (1951). But a professor in the university is not a
public officer in any sense that excludes the existence of a contract relation
between himself and the board employing him. His is purely a contract
relation. Butler v. Regents, 32 Wis. 124 (1873).166 Wis. Laws ch. 433 (1949), now Wis. STAT. sec. 40.777 (1951).
167 119 Wis. 362, 96 N.W. 797 (1903).
168 119 Wis. at 366, 96 N.W. at 799.
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A Wisconsin law of 1903 required a license from the state insurance
commissioner before any organization could conduct an accident or
health insurance business. But specifically exempted were fraternal
organizations having a lodge system "with ritualistic work," and any
benefit society connected with any church or religious society.' 69 Attor-
ney General Sturdevant was forthright in his opinion that this law
imposed a religious test in violation of the equal protection of the laws.
"Under this act an association may do an insurance business
if its members have certain religious opinions, so as to conform
to the creed of a church or religious society. Others doing the
same business in the same community and not belonging to a
church or religious society may not do these acts without in-
curring the penalty of the law. A classification based upon such
distinctions as these ... cannot stand. The State cannot deprive
persons of the equal protection of the laws. It cannot grant
special privileges to one citizen and deny them to another
similarly situated. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States was designed to prevent any person
or class of persons from being singled out as special subjects
of discriminating and hostile legislation. . . . In my opinion,
classification cannot be based on the use of ritual or on religious
belief; nor, as to individuals, can it be based on membership in
a church.17 0
The distinction between the Barry case and this opinion. of the
Attorney General is clear. The latter concerned governmental impo-
sition of a religious test which is illegal. But the Barry case held that
private religious tests are permissible. Thus, in an action for construc-
tion of a will, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a bequest of a
mother to her son conditioned upon his regular attendance at a
Lutheran church. On the basis of the Barry case, Judge Kerwin said
for the court:
"It is not easy to see how the conditions attached to the will
in any manner infringe . . . constitutional provision. The condi-
tion in question is neither against public policy nor contrary to
law, nor can it be said that it interferes with the right of the
legatee to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience .... The testatrix has the right to so dispose of her
property and the legatee might accept or reject the gift volun-






169 Wis. Laws ch. 413 (1903).
170 REPT. OF ATT'Y GEN. 279, 282-3 (1904). For discussion of the purposes of
the 14th Amendment from the point of view of the intent of its framers,
see: Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? 2 STAN. L. REV. 5-139 (1949). A mutual insurance company (Aid
Association for Lutherans) can prohibit its members from affiliating with
certain secret societies upon penalty of expulsion and forfeiture of accumu-
lations. 4 Os. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 992 (1915).
171 In re Paulson's Will, 127 Wis. 612, 618-9, 107 N.W. 484, 487 (1906).
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Competency of Witnesses
The legislature of the Wisconsin Territory provided in 1839 that
any person believing in "any other than the christian religion" should
be sworn according to the ceremonies of his religion. Or his belief in
the existence of a "supreme being" was sufficient to admit him to be
sworn, if he was otherwise competent. But even this was not necessary
if his "belief or unbelief" in a supreme being could be proved by other
competent authority. 72 The first state legislature incorporated these
provisions without changeY.7 3
The statutes became more secular in 1858 with the deletion of any
reference to a "supreme being" and permitting merely a "solemn
declaration or affirmation" for anyone having "conscientious scruples
against taking any oath, or swearing in any form."'174 The widely
known "so help you God" oath was introduced in 1878, and a secular
affirmation was framed for those who had "conscientious scruples."' 75
The law has remained generally unchanged since 1878. Thus, today,
in all judicial proceedings, witnesses must swear to this oath:
"Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you shall give
in [here indicating the action, proceeding or matter on trial or
being inquired into], shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God."' 7'
By merely raising his hand the person being sworn may manifest his
assent. 7 7 But this form is not exclusive for it is also provided that
"Any oath or affidavit required or authorized by law may be
taken in any of the usual forms, and every person swearing,
affirming or declaring in any such form shall be deemed to have
been lawfully sworn.' 78
Those having "conscientious scruples" must make their solemn declara-
tion or affirmation, with an "uplifted hand," as follows:
Do you solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that
the testimony you shall give in [here indicate the action . . ]
shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth;
and this you do under the pains and penalties of perjury. 79
'
7 2 WISCONSIN TERRITORIAL STATUTES 240-41 (1839).
17 Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 99, secs. 4, 5, and 6 (1849).174 Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 137, sec. 109 (1858).
75 WIs. REV. STAT. ch. 156, sec. 3637 (1878).
176WIs. STAT. sec. 326.025(1) (1951).
177 WIs. STAT. sec. 326.025(2) (1951).
178 WIS. STAT. sec. 326.03 (1951). The record of a 7-year-old child's examination
and her answers to the questions put to her both by the magistrate to
determine her competency and by counsel to determine facts of an automobile
accident sufficiently showed that she was capable of understanding the
obligation to make truthful answers to questions asked. In the circumstances,
the receiving of her testimony in the preliminary examination, without
administering an oath, was not error. State ex tel. Shields v. Portman, 242
Wis. 5, 6 N.W.2d 713 (1942).
179 WIs. STAT. sec. 326.04 (1951).
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It is evident that the state, through its police power, may protect
the public welfare by requiring persons to swear or declare that they
will tell the truth before they may become competent witnesses in
judicial proceedings. But in Wisconsin no religious act has ever been
necessary to establish such competency. Wisconsin's laws concerning
the administration of justice for the protection of the public welfare
thus contain specific safeguards that preclude invasion of the right of
conscience. There is no conflict between religion and the state here.180
CONCLUSION
Wisconsin has a good record in the exercise of its police power
from a religious liberty frame of reference. Indeed, the state has
"leaned over backwards" to accommodate nonconforming religious
practices while seeking to protect the public welfare. Special provisions
have been adopted by the legislature to obviate giving offense to
Quakers and Christian Scientists. Jehovah's Witnesses need not fear
obstruction in the distribution of their literature or the holding of
religious meetings in public places, so long as they-or anybody--do
not abuse these privileges. Clergymen of all faiths stand equally before
the law, and as a class they actualy enjoy certain privileges not accorded
others.
If there be any religious persecution or discrimination in Wisconsin,
the state may not legally be a party to it. In a few instances, individuals
have mistakenly claimed discrimination when the state's police power
has been reasonably exercised. The foregoing discussion seems to add
up to the conclusion, however, that while the state must jealously guard
the religious rights of each individual-even to the extent of according
to religious liberty preferred treatment-the state must also protect the
rights of the community to enjoy health and safety, and a moral and
comfortable environment.
180 Unless an oath was legally administered, a conviction for false swearing in
making an affidavit cannot be sustained. But the oath must be considered to
have been administered whenever the attention of the affiant is called to the
fact that the statement is not a mere assertion but must be sworn to and he
does any unequivocal corporal act in response thereto. The mere recitation
of the affidavit that it was upon oath is prima facie evidence that the oath
was legally administered and strong and convincing proof to the contrary
is necessary to rebut such a presumption. 21 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 194, 196-7
(1932), citing United States v. Mallard, 40 Fed. 151, 151-2 (1889) to the
effect that no religious act is necessary in the swearing of witnesses. See:
Swancara, Non-Religious Witnesses, 8 Wis. L. REV. 49 (1932); Platz, A
Code of Evidence for Wisconsin? Various Privileges, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 239.
It is to be noted that Wis. STAT. sec. 328.09(2) (1951) provides that church,
parish, or baptismal records may be admitted as prima facie evidence of any
fact relAting to any birth, stillbirth, marriage, or death.
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